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C A M P A I G N  F I N A N C E
Despite reformers’ calls for disclosure, anonymity 
may better prevent influence peddling.
Should Campaign 
Donors Be Identified?
B y  Ia n  Ay r e s
Yale Law School
bou t t h e on ly c a m pa ign
finance issue on which there is a
strong consensus is the belief that
the law should force candidates to
disclose the identity of contributors.
A growing group of scholars and
advocates believe that mandated disclosure should be the
only campaign finance regulation; they argue that other
restrictions are counterproductive because they tend to
shift money to less accountable forms of political speech
such as “independent expenditures” and “issue advocacy.” 
Representative John T. Doolittle (R-Calif.) has proposed
the “Citizen Legislature and Political Freedom Act” that
essentially would repeal all limits on political campaign
contributions and merely require immediate disclosure by
candidates when they do receive contributions. This type
of “pure disclosure” reform has garnered support from a
wide spectrum of political activists, from Sen. Mitch
McConnell (R-Ky.) to Stanford Law School dean Kathleen
Sullivan. 
But there exists in our polity a counter-image—the
voting booth—that stands against the cult of disclosure. Bal-
lot secrecy was adopted toward the end of the nineteenth
century to deter political corruption. Voting booth priva-
cy disrupted the economics of vote buying, making it much
more difficult for candidates to buy votes because, at the
end of the day, they could never know for sure who voted
for them.
A similar pro-anonymity argument can be applied to
campaign finance. We could harness similar anonymity
benefits by creating a “donation booth”: a screen that forces
donors to funnel campaign contributions through blind
trusts that would keep candidates from learning the identi-
ty of their supporters. Just as the secret ballot makes it more
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difficult for candidates to buy votes, mandating anonymous
donations through a system of blind trusts might make it
harder for candidates to sell access or influence because they
would never know which donors had paid the price. Knowl-
edge about whether the other side actually fulfills his or her
promise is an important prerequisite for trade. People—
including political candidates—are less likely to deal if they
are uncertain whether the other side performs.
MITIGATING CORRUPTION
The impetus for disclosure is that a public armed with
knowledge about political contributions would be able to
punish candidates who sell their office or who are other-
wise inappropriately influenced by wealthy donors. It has,
however, proved exceedingly difficult to infer inappropri-
ate influence from the mere fact of contributions; politicians
claim they would have acted the same way regardless of
whether a questionable contribution had been made. More-
over, there is no legal prohibition against selling access
(i.e. “face time”) in return for contributions, and today’s
jaded citizenry rarely imposes any electoral punishment on
candidates known to have sold political access. In sum,
mandatory public disclosure would do little to deter quid
pro quo corruption: types of corruption that could be
proven (contributions for access) are legal and are of little
interest to voters, while types of corruption that are illegal
(contributions for influence) cannot be proven. At most, dis-
closure would deter only the most egregious and express
types of influence peddling. 
In contrast, a regime of mandated anonymity interferes
with an informational prerequisite for corruption. Put sim-
ply, it would be more difficult for candidates to sell access or
influence if they did not know that a donation was made. An
anonymous “donation booth” would severely impede quid
pro quo corruption, whether in the form of explicit trades
(donations for nights in the Lincoln bedroom, presidential cof-
fees, legislative activity) or implicit deals such as the assump-
tion that an officeholder would “owe one” to a donor.
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Mandated anonymity could also deter politicians from
extorting donations. Politicians can now threaten potential
donors with unfavorable treatment unless a sufficiently
large contribution is made. The potential for such extortion
could explain why several corporations have privately
agreed not to make soft money contributions. Fear of extor-
tion may keep private interest groups from organizing
because politicians will have a harder time shaking down
an unorganized mass of private interests. Mandated donor
anonymity would allow such private interests to organize
without fear of becoming targets for extortion.
Disrupting feedback Even when politicians do not condi-
tion their behavior on contributions, they may nonetheless
expect that taking certain positions will cause donors to
give more money. And even when wealthy donors do not
expect their giving to change a candidate’s behavior, they
may reasonably believe that giving to a candidate with
whom they agree will increase that candidate’s chance of
(re)election. In the first instance, the possibility exists that
a contribution has a corruptive influence on the candi-
date’s behavior. In the second, even though the candidate’s
positions are uncorrupted (that is, “unchanged”) by the
contribution, the contributions of those with dispropor-
tionate wealth corrupt the process by increasing the like-
lihood that positions favored by the wealthy will be dis-
proportionately favored in our political sphere.
Mandated anonymity would reduce the corrupting influ-
ence of contributions on candidates’ behavior by reducing
both the candidates’ feedback about how particular positions
affect giving and the willingness of donors to make large
donations to influence candidate behavior. Candidates would
still learn the total amount of money that had been con-
tributed to their campaigns, but they would not learn how
particular positions translated into particular contributions. 
Mandated anonymity would create a kind of Tiebout
model for candidates’ policies. In the original Tiebout
model, different towns committed to particular taxes and
amenities, and then potential citizens voted with their feet
by moving to the towns with the tax and expenditure pack-
age they most preferred. Mandated anonymity would push
the contribution market in the same direction. Politicians
would announce policies, and then wait and see whether
those policies garnered financial support. Granted, such
waiting is not true independent leadership, but it is likely to
be more independent than the current regime – one in
which private interests can immediately bestow gifts on a
politician to show appreciation for certain policies.
The donor’s paradox Just as it is irrational to vote when
there is an infinitesimal chance that one’s vote will affect
the election, it is also irrational to donate to a campaign if
one’s gift imperceptibly increases the chance of a candi-
date’s victory. Under the current regime, politicians over-
come this “donor’s paradox” by developing a reputation for











KNOW YOUR DONOR:Republicans Alfonse D’Amato (l),
Christine Todd Whitman, George Palaki, and Betsy
McCaughey at a Pataki-McCaughey fundraiser in 1994.
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their contributions to yield concrete benefits concerning
a candidate’s policy, legislative activity, or—at the very
least—the candidate’s willingness to meet with the donor.
But mandated anonymity greatly diminishes the expected
return on an individual donation and, in all likelihood,
will substantially reduce the number of large donations. It
would be difficult for candidates to provide favors or spe-
cial access to individual contributors without knowing
the contributors’ identities.
Mandating donor anonymity would reduce the dis-
proportionate influence of wealth on our political system,
not only by reducing the number of large donations but also,
possibly, by increasing the number of small donations.
Under the current system, small donors have virtually no
impact on the electoral process. By reducing the importance
of large donations, mandated anonymity would make small
donors relatively more important and thus might induce less
affluent donors to give more. 
ANONYMITY VS. DISCLOSURE
So, which is better: mandated disclosure or mandated
anonymity? If we were to repeal all contribution or expen-
diture limitations and were only to regulate information
about contributions, which form of regulation should we
prefer?  I believe that mandated anonymity would be prefer-
able because it is a less restrictive alternative and it is more
likely to deter political corruption.  
Mandated anonymity can be structured to give con-
tributors more liberty—for example, allowing them to say
anything about how much they gave—than under manda-
tory disclosure regimes and thus should be presumptive-
ly superior from a libertarian perspective. Mandated dis-
closure forces contributors to speak whether they want to
or not, while mandatory anonymity would allow donors
to tell candidates anything (or nothing) that they want
about their contribution. While neither regime is truly
laissez-faire (because mandated anonymity does not allow
a contributor to prove that he has given a large gift), man-
dated anonymity clearly dominates mandated disclosure
on libertarian grounds.
Shifting money Critics are quick to point out that mandated
anonymity is likely to convert some direct contributions
into independent, “issue advocacy” expenditures (where
anonymity cannot be required), but fail to see that mandat-
ed disclosure, if it were effective in deterring political cor-
ruption, would also be likely to shift some direct contribu-
tions toward issue ads (where disclosure cannot be required). 
No one has ever worried that mandated disclosure has
caused a shift toward issue advocacy. The lack of concern is
strong evidence of disclosure’s ineffectiveness. The simple rea-
son why mandated disclosure is unlikely to push money
“hydraulically” toward issue advocacy is that disclosing the
identity of donors deters very little corruption. If disclosure
did deter some types of corruption, hydraulicists would have
to predict that the deterred contributions would resurface as
issue advocacy. It is analytically impossible to be a hard-core
hydraulicist (who believes that any campaign restriction
causes a dollar-for-dollar shift toward unrestrictable issue
advocacy) and an advocate of mandatory
disclosure. To advocate disclosure, you
must concede that at least some restric-
tions are not completely undone by
hydraulicism.
Disclosure regimes may make us feel
good about ourselves, but they probably
produce much the same results as a true
laissez-faire regime in which contribu-
tors have complete freedom to remain
anonymous or to disclose their identities
to the candidate or the public. Reasonable
people could disfavor mandated anonymity—for exam-
ple, because of the predictable shift of resources toward
less accountable issue advocacy—but they should not par-
ticularly favor mandated disclosure because it generates
substantial benefits beyond a laissez-faire regime.
Anonymity’s benefits Mandatory anonymity — even if
perfectly implemented — is not a panacea. Candidates would
still have incentive to take certain positions in order to gen-
erate contributions, and the wealthy would continue to have
a disproportionate voice in electioneering. But the donation
booth offers three key benefits over the current system:
•Anonymity would make it more difficult for politi-
cians to reward their contributors.
•Anonymity would substantially reduce the num-
ber of large donors.
•Anonymity might increase the number of small
donors.
In contrast, mandatory disclosure is much less likely to
produce those outcomes. Monetary influence and inequal-
ity could only be deterred if voters punished candidates who
pandered to contributors or received disproportionate
contributions because of their position favoring wealthy
contributors. America’s experience with mandatory dis-
closure is that the benefits to a candidate of having extra
contributions for the campaign almost always outweigh any
possibility that some voters will be put off by the fact of the
contribution itself. At the end of the day, a workable regime
of mandated anonymity is likely to have a much larger
effect than mandated disclosure on monetary influence
It would be difficult for candidates to provide
favors or special access to contributors
without knowing the contributors’ identities.
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and inequality for the simple reason that it is likely to
reduce the number of five- and six-figure contributions.
HOW WOULD IT WORK?
All candidates, political parties, and political action com-
mittees (pacs) would establish blind trust accounts at pri-
vate trust companies with substantial, preexisting assets
(of say, more than $100 million). Representatives of the
blind trust could not be employed in positions influenc-
ing access or policy—and, as a prophylactic, should be
required not to communicate privately with candidates or
campaign workers. 
The core regulation would require that all donations to
candidates, political parties, and pacs be made by mail to the
blind trusts. Campaigns would no longer be allowed to
accept money in cash or check. Large donors would have the
option of having the trust disclose that they had given at least
$200, but under no circumstance would the trust identify a
donor as having contributed more than $200.
The blind trusts would then report to the candidates on
a weekly or a biweekly basis the total
amount that had been donated, but not
detail any individual donations exceed-
ing $200. Candidates could still ask
individuals for support, but could not
close the deal. That, by itself, might free
politicians from the current fundraising
marathon of constantly seeking con-
tributions. A candidate could still have
fundraisers and limit invitations to rich,
registered voters of the same party. But
under a regime of mandated anonymi-
ty, the dinner could not be priced above cost. Instead, cam-
paign workers could do no more than distribute
postage-free envelopes addressed to the blind trust so that
attendees could later mail in a contribution. 
The trust’s books would be publicly audited only some
number of years after the candidate left office. The ex post
auditing would allow donors to be sure that their dona-
tions had in fact gone to their candidate and to allow the pub-
lic to assess whether donations were, notwithstanding the
trust, purchasing access or influence. 
Improper disclosure What is to stop a donor from telling
a candidate on the sly about a large “soft money” contri-
bution? Absolutely nothing. But talk is cheap. Anyone can
claim to have donated to a candidate, just like anyone can
claim to have voted for a candidate. But the voting booth
makes it impossible for a voter to prove that he voted for a
particular candidate, and just so, an anonymous donation
booth would make it impossible for a donor to prove that
he gave to a particular campaign. What is more, non-donors
could easily mimic the signals of real donors, making it
difficult for unscrupulous candidates to determine to whom
they owe favors. 
But what if people were to try to get around the system
by having campaign officials witness the mailing of the
donations? We could defeat that practice by adopting a
10-day cooling-off period in which contributors could can-
cel their contribution. A cooling-off period would give
non-donors as well as donors the ability to cancel checks that
were sent to the trust.
Of course, candidates would still know a lot about some
of the sources of their campaign funds. Ross Perot would
know how much he gave to himself. Bill Clinton would
know how many New Hampshire cocktail parties a par-
ticular supporter threw on his behalf. Donating your time
to fundraising might still get you an ambassadorship. But
the effect would be muted, because the candidate would not
be able to see how much money a particular person raised. 
Direct spending Mandating anonymous donations would
undoubtedly lead some donors to directly purchase tele-
vision ads supporting a candidate. The U.S. Constitution
prohibits the limiting of individuals’ ability to speak direct-
ly. Direct speech, uncoordinated with candidate cam-
paigns, would therefore allow rich individuals to contin-
ue to signal their willingness to spend money on behalf of
particular candidates. 
But “direct speech” end runs would not completely
undermine the effectiveness of mandated anonymity.
Current law limits the ability of corporations and labor
unions to engage in direct speech. Moreover, independ-
ent “direct speech” ads are not as valuable to candidates
(and therefore would not purchase as much influence)
because candidates cannot control their content. And
few individuals have sufficient resources to purchase
effective broadcast campaigns. 
Under a regime of mandated anonymity, candidates
might still take positions in order to induce independent
issue ads on their behalf (and vice versa), but it will be
more difficult for individuals who had been giving, say,
$10,000 or $20,000 to a party and its candidates to find an
equally effective issue ad substitute. To be sure, inde-
pendent issue ad organizations will start soliciting con-
tributions, but the organizations are likely to find it more
difficult to convince the erstwhile political donor to con-
tribute. This is because it will be less clear to potential
donors that a contribution to an independent organization
will lead candidates to give heightened access or influ-
ence, especially because the benefits to the candidate of
truly independent issue advocacy are less pronounced.
What is to stop a donor from telling a candidate
about a large contribution? Absolutely nothing.
But talk is cheap and people can claim anything. 
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While I concede that mandated anonymity would lead
to an increase in independent issue ads, I simultaneously
predict that a regime of mandated anonymity would nev-
ertheless reduce quid pro quo and monetary influence cor-
ruption by reducing the overall level of direct and indirect
contributions – i.e., both independent expenditures and
issue advocacy. An anonymous donation booth is likely
to dramatically reduce the number of large “soft money”
contributions. Moreover, mandated anonymity would pro-
hibit the current practice of pac bundling, whereby pacs
gain influence with candidates by bundling together con-
tributions from individual donors.
The predictable shift of contributions toward less
accountable issue advocacy—even if only partial—pro-
vides some reason for opposing a mandated anonymity
regime. But that same concern should also undermine
mandated disclosure regimes. If mandated disclosure could
deter corrupt direct giving, the critics would have to fear that
the same corrupt contributions would reappear as anony-
mous issue advocacy ads. Mandated disclosure might not
deter corruption, but merely shift it to less accountable
independent expenditures.
IS IT CONSTITUTIONAL?
Mandated anonymity is clearly constitutional. It burdens
speech less than mandated disclosure and is more likely
to further the government’s compelling interest in deter-
ring corruption. And while the Supreme Court has upheld
the constitutionality of mandated disclosure, appreciat-
ing the possibility of mandated anonymity calls into
question whether a disclosure regime constitutes the
least restrictive alternative, as required by the First
Amendment.
In locating the exact anonymity burden, we should
begin by remembering what the proposal does not do. It
does not affect how much a donor can contribute, and it
does not limit the words a donor might say. The regime
would even allow a donor to prove that she had given at least
$200 to a campaign. The only burden of the anonymity
proposal is that donors could not prove that they had given
more than $200.
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence suggests that the
size of that burden is rather marginal, particularly because
donors could prove they contributed $200. The Court in
Buckley v. Valeo found:
A contribution serves as a general expression of
support for the candidate and his views, but does not
communicate the underlying basis for the support.
The quantity of communication by the contribu-
tor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his
contribution, since the expression rests solely on
the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing.
A donor’s burden of proving that she gave a candidate
$1,000 instead of $200 should be considered only a marginal
restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free
communication. And the burden of the restriction is mit-
igated by the donor’s unrestricted ability to speak inde-
pendently in favor of a particular candidate.
The right to spend Bruce Ackerman’s
“brute property” argument, presented in
his article “Crediting the Voters: A New
Beginning for Campaign Finance,” correctly
identifies a deeply held impulse in our poli-
ty: “It’s my property and I have a right to use
it to support any candidate I want.” Manda-
tory anonymity accommodates the brute
property impulse while simultaneously
restraining property’s influence. The dona-
tion booth does not affect how property
can be used, nor does it limit the words (or other signals) a
donor may employ to describe her use. But because the
ability to prove credibly how one uses her property is not
a firmly established concomitant of ownership, the anony-
mous donation booth does not directly contradict the brute
property impulse.
Comparison The constitutionality of mandated anonymi-
ty can most clearly be demonstrated by comparing the con-
stitutional costs and benefits of the specific proposal to two
other free speech restrictions that have passed constitu-
tional scrutiny: mandated voter anonymity and compelled
disclosure of donor identity (reporting requirements). By
showing that mandated anonymity is less burdensome and
more supportive of the government’s interest in preventing
corruption, the comparisons provide two a fortiori argu-
ments for the constitutionality of anonymity regulation.
First, the constitutionality of the voting booth—i.e.,
mandated voting anonymity—suggests that mandated
donor anonymity is also constitutional. It can be claimed
that the voting booth burdens political expression; no mat-
ter how much a voter wants, she cannot prove that she
voted for a specific candidate. Because voting is the quin-
tessential act of political expression, denying citizens the
right to prove for whom they voted is surely more burden-
some than denying citizens the right to prove they gave a
candidate more than $200.
Although the privacy of the voting booth is an inno-
vation of less than 100 years’ standing, we cannot conceive
that the Supreme Court would strike down this form of
mandated anonymity as unduly burdening voters’ free
Mandatory anonymity accomodates the
belief that “it’s my money and I have a right
to support any candidate that I want.”
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speech rights. Opponents of mandated donor anonymi-
ty will be hard pressed to explain why mandatory anony-
mous donation is unconstitutional, but anonymous vot-
ing is not.
Second, the Supreme Court’s willingness in Buckley to
approve compelled disclosure of donor identity suggests that
compelled nondisclosure is all the more constitutional.
Mandated disclosure is more burdensome than mandated
anonymity. The Supreme Court has traditionally protect-
ed the right to silence or anonymity much more than the
right to speak credibly. Plenty of cases can be found in
which the Supreme Court struck down regulations requir-
ing speakers to identify themselves. But it is hard to find
court decisions that support the notion that the First
Amendment was abridged by a statute that prohibited a
speaker from proving that what he says is true. Indeed, the
strong anti-libel impulse enunciated by Justice Hugo Black
and others makes it harder for speakers to signal the truth
of their allegations credibly because false statements often
do not expose the speaker to monetary damages. 
Mandated disclosure also is less likely to further the
government’s interest in preventing corruption. Even
though the Supreme Court suggested that mandated dis-
closure could deter corruption, it has proven exceeding-
ly difficult to demonstrate either quid pro quo or mone-
tary-influence corruption from the mere knowledge of
identity. As adumbrated above, donor anonymity is more
likely to deter corruption because uninformed candidates
have less opportunity to peddle influence or change their
positions in the hope of garnering greater contributions—
and that effect is likely to be stronger than any voter dis-
cipline produced by a mandatory disclosure regime. 
Indeed, the possibility of mandated anonymity calls
into question the constitutionality of mandated disclosure.
The First Amendment requires not only that the effect of
furthering the government’s compelling interest out-
weigh the speech burden, but also that government
choose the least restrictive alternative for achieving its
compelling interest. Buckley did not discuss the “least
restrictive alternative” requirement when it allowed that
mandated disclosure was constitutional, but that omission
was probably the result of a belief by the court that law-
makers’ only relevant informational regulatory options
were mandated disclosure or laissez-faire regimes. Now
that we realize that mandated anonymity could provide
a smaller speech burden while deterring corruption, it
becomes difficult to characterize mandated disclosure
as the least restrictive alternative.
CONCLUSION
This article stands against the strong consensus in favor of
disclosure in campaigns. But then, the secret ballot stands
against the one-time consensus in favor of disclosure in
elections. We should remind ourselves why we chose to
make voting a solitary act. Anyone opposing mandated
donor anonymity needs to explain why we should not also
jettison mandated voting anonymity.
Mandated anonymity provides a useful perspective
from which to rethink mandated disclosure. In the end,
reasonable people might reject the anonymous donation
booth because of the likely increase in issue advocacy. If
mandated anonymity induces even a partial shift of con-
tributions toward that form of reckless and unaccountable
speech, we might not want to extend the voting booth
rationale to campaign finance. But mandated disclosure
regimes—if effective—should give rise to similar effects. The
visceral sense that mandated disclosure does not create a
similar shift probably stems from the sense that few corrupt
donations are in fact deterred by a disclosure requirement. 
For those who favor the move to a pure disclosure
regime largely on libertarian grounds, a pure anonymity
regime gives donors even more freedom of speech—the
cherished freedom not to speak. The donation booth is
not a panacea, but it keeps faith with the simple and wide-
ly held belief that the size of your purse should not deter-
mine your access to government.
For more on the campaign finance debate, 
visit Cato’s special website:
www.cato.org/campaignfinance
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